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CURRENT DECISIONS
Constitutional Law--GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL AND LOYALTY OATHS.

After being offered a teaching position with the University of Maryland, appellant Whitehill refused to take the teacher's loyalty oath
which demanded that he certify that he was not engaged in an attempt
to overthrow the Governments of Maryland or the United States.' In
a suit for declaratory relief, appellant challenged the constitutionality
of the oath, but the Maryland District Court dismissed the complaint.2 On appeal, the Supreme Court reasoned that the oath was to
be construed with the alteration 3 and membership 4 clauses of the
1. In its entirety, the oath provides as follows:
",
, do hereby certify that I am not engaged in one way or another in
the attempt to overthrow the Government of the United States, or the State of Maryland, or any political subdivision of either of them by force or violence.
I further certify that I understand the aforegoing statement is made subject to the
penalties of perjury prescribed in Article 27, Section 439 of the Annotated Code of
Maryland (1957 edition)." Prepared by the Maryland Attorney General, the oath was
approved by the Board of Regents. The Board had the authority to provide the oath
under section 11 of the Subversive Activities Act of 1949 (Ober Act). This provides:
"'Every person and every board, commission, council, department, court or other
agency of the State of Maryland or any political subdivision thereof, who or which
appoints or employs or supervises in any manner the appointment or employment of
public officials or employees shall establish by rules, regulation or otherwise, procedures designed to ascertain before any person, including teachers and other employees
of any public educational institution in this State, is appointed or employed, that he
or she as the case may be, is not a subversive person, and that there are no reasonable
grounds to believe such persons are subversive persons. In the event such reasonable
grounds exist, he or she as the case may be shall not be appointed or employed. In
securing any facts necessary to ascertain the information herein required, the applicant
shall be required to sign a written statement containing answers to such inquiries as
may be material, which statement shall contain notice that it is subject to the penalties
of perjury. ANN. CoDE oF MD. art. 85A, § 11 (1957).
2. Whitehill v. Elkins, 258 F. Supp. 589 (D. Md. 1966).
3. ANN. CODE OF XID. art. 85A, § 1 (1957).

"Subversive person" means any person

who commits, attempts to commit, or aids in the commission, or advocates, abets, advises or teaches by any means any person to commit, attempt to commit, or aid in the
commission of any act intended to overthrow, destroy or alter, or to assist in the
overthrow, destruction or alteration of, the constitutional form of the government of
the United States, or of the State of Maryland, or any political subdivision of either
of them, by revolution, force, or violence; or who is a member of a subversive organization or a foreign subversive organization.
4. ANN. CODE OF MD. art. 84A, § 13 (1957). "Every person who on June 1, 1949
shall be in the employ of the State . . . shall be required . . . to make a written

[879 1

WILLIAM

AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9:879

Maryland Ober Act,5 and found the oath invalid for vagueness.6
Civil loyalty oaths became the object of Supreme Court' concern
and decision in the early 1950's.8 In Gerende v. Board of Supervisors,9
the Court found constitutional a Maryland oath'0 demanding of candidates for election a certification that they were not engaged "in one
way or another in the attempt to overthrow the government by force or
violence, and that he is not now a member of an organization engaged
in such an attempt." 11
After Gerende, membership clauses and the problem of scienter were
the focus of vigorous attacks upon the constitutionality of various
oaths. 12 What emerged from these attacks was the rule that knowledge
statement which shall contain notice that it is subject to the penalties of perjury, that
he or she is not a subversive person as defined in this article . . . or [that he or she
is not] a member of a subversive organization or a foreign subversive organization ...
5. ANN. Come OF MD. art. 85A (1957).

6. Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54 (1967). In a six to three decision, Justices Harlan,
Stewart and White dissented.
7. At the time of the first Supreme Court determinations, three state courts had dealt
or were dealing with the validity and constitutionality of civil loyalty oaths. In
Imbrie v. Marsh, 3 N.J. 578, 71 A.2d 352 (1950), a New Jersey oath was found
invalid because there was no statutory prohibition of the holding of a public office by
subversives. Accord, Tolman v. Underhill, 39 Cal.2d 676, 249 P.2d 280 (1951). In determining the constitutionality of an oath authorized by the Maryland Ober Act and required of candidates for election, the court in Shub v. Simpson, 76 A.2d 332 (Md. 1950),
distinguished Imbrie and provided the base for a later reconciliation with Tolman by
recognizing the oath valid because it was expressly authorized by legislative enactment.
8. Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56 (1951) (per curiam); American
Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
9. 341 U.S. 56 (1951) (per curiam).
10. Although the oath was to be taken by candidates for election in compliance
with section 15 of the Ober Act, the statements are the same as would have been
prescribed for public employees under section 11 of that Act.
11. Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56, 56-7 (1951) (per curiam). It is
apparent that the Court, by choosing to accept the Maryland Attorney General's narrow interpretative view of the oath, avoided the constitutional problems presented by
the enabling Ober Act. The Court did not pass upon or approve the definition of
"subversive" or the validity of the membership provision, and accordingly, deprived
the decision of the vitality and import which it might have enjoyed.
12. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); Adler v. Board of Education, 342
U.S. 485 (1952); Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951). The primary
problem in each of these decisions was scienter, i.e., whether the individual must know
of his membership in a questionable organization, or whether that individual must
know of the aims and purposes of the organization. The oaths in both Garner (California) and Adler (New York) were determined valid, although the decisions were
based on contra approaches. The Garner Court refused to raise a presumption of
knowledge through membership and they reasoned: "We have no reason to suppose
that the oath is or will be construed .. . as affecting adversely those persons who
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of purpose, and not innocent association, be the foundation upon which
membership clauses are drafted, applied, and interpreted.' 3 Coupling
this requirement with the precept that the statutes authorizing the
oaths not be vague,14 the Court, while finding the oaths of Pennsylvania, 15 New York, 16 and New Hampshire 17 constitutional, invalidated
20
those of California, 8 Arkansas, 19 and Florida.
during their affiliation with a proscribed organization were innocent of its purpose .... ." Garner v. Board of Public Works, supra at 723.
Although finding the questioned provision of the Feinberg Law constitutional, a
presumption of scienter was raised in Adler. "Membership in a listed organization
found to be within the statute and known by a member to be within the statute is
a legislative finding that the member by his membership supports the thing the
organization stands for, namely, the overthrow of government by unlawful means. We
cannot say that such a finding is contrary to fact or that 'generality of experience' points
to a different conclusion." Adler v. Board of Education, supra at 494-95.
In Wieman, an Oklahoma statute requiring each state employee to take an oath that
he has not been a member of a subversive organization for the preceding five years
was found to violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. As construed by the Oklahoma Supreme Court, membership was the sole disqualiflying factor.
In their demand that knowledge be evidenced, the Wievman Supreme Court refused the
Oklahoma court's interpretation.
13. "Indiscriminate classification of innocent with knowing activity must fall as an
assertion of arbitrary power. The oath offends due process." Wieman v. Updegraff,
344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952).
14. E.g., United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174 (1952); Stromberg v. California, 282
U.S. 359 (1931); Connally v. General Construction Company, 269 U.S. 385 (1926). Although these decisions did not deal with the validity of loyalty oaths, the vagueness
rule is one which pervades the entire sphere of statutory construction and interpretation.
15. Beilan v. Board of Public Education, 357 U.S. 399 (1958). Upon petitioner's
refusal to answer questions as to Communistic activities, the teacher was discharged
on the ground that the refusal was tantamount to "incompetency" under the state
tenure laws. The issue of due process was confusingly intermingled with the statutory
questions, and the decision ultimately turned on the statutory construction. In a six
to three decision, the dissenters were Warren, Douglas, and Brennan.
16. Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958). When the appellant refused to state that
he was not a member of the Communist party, he was discharged. The Court affirmed
and reasoned that a finding of doubtful trust and reliability could justifiably be based
on appellants lack of frankness . . . ." Id. at 476. In a six to three decision, Justices
Douglas, Brennan, and Warren dissented.
. 17. Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959). In a five to four decision, Warren, Brennan, Black, and Douglas dissented.
18. In Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958), the Court held that enforcement of
an oath provision requiring one to assert his loyalty as a prerequisite for tax exemptions denied the appellant his freedom of speech. As the statutory framework called
for the individual to carry the burden of proof on whether he was a subversive, the
Court determined that it is not within the province of a legislature to declare an

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9:879

The eventual erosion of the Gerende oath began with the holding

2
that Washington's loyalty oath statutes, patterned after the Ober Act, '

were invalid for vagueness. 22 The basic statutory infirmity was the
inability to objectively measure the "advocates, abets, advises, or

24
teaches" 28 description of a subversive person.
In Elfbrandt v. Russell,25 the membership clause of the Gerende oath
was impliedly invalidated. 26 The Court added to the scienter require-

ment a need to establish that the oath-taker was an active member

"with a specific intent to further the illegal aims of the organization." 27
In Wbitebill v. Elkins the Court, by looking beyond the demands of
the oath which did not jeopardize the appellant's freedom of speech
or association to the enabling Ober Act, has adopted a seemingly novel
approach in this first amendment area. 28 The ultimate solution, howindividual guilty or presumptively guilty of a crime." Id. at 523-24. Justice Clark was
the sole dissenter.
19. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). A statute which required every teacher,
as a condition of employment, to file an affidavit listing every organization to which
he has belonged within the preceding five years was found invalid as depriving teachers
of their right of associational freedom. The scope of the affidavit was completely unlimited, and it is on this ground that the decision can be reconciled with Beilam v.
Board of Public Education, 357 U.S. 399 (1958). See note 15, supra. Shelton was a
five to four decision, with Frankfurter, Harlan, Clark, and Whittaker dissenting.
20. Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961). In a unanimous
decision, the Court found the statutory terms "aid, support, advise, counsel or influence"
invalid for vagueness.
21. In the wake of Gerende Washington adopted the Maryland definitions of subversive person, subversive organization, and foreign subversive organization. 9 Rzv.
CODE OF WASH. ANN. ch. 9.81.100 (1962).
22. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
23. 9 REv. CODE OF WASH. ANN. ch. 9.81.100, para. 5 (1962).
24. The Court carefully explained its prior decision in Gerende by again reminding
that it did not treat on the constitutionality of the subversive person definition. Although Justice Clark in his dissent laments the overruling of Gerende, it is apparent
that Gerende stood only for the acceptability of a specific oath and not for the statutory framework from which the oath was issued. In Baggett, Justices Clark and Harlan
dissented.
25. 384 U.S. 11 (1966). Justices Harlan, Clark, White, and Stewart dissented.
26. Both Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951) and Wieman v.
Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) "can be read as overruling the Gerende membership
clause because of the introduction of the scienter requirement. Elfbrandt is but the final
step in this overruling. 27. Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 19 (1966).
28. The novelty, however, does not represent a sudden shift in the state of the law.
In only one other case was the Court confronted with the problem of a strictly drawn
oath issued from a vague and broad statute. That case was Gerende. In the other
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ever, was expected.29 It was demanded by Baggett and Elfbrandt.
In the case at bar, the Court impliedly conceded that the specific
oath was not invalid for vagueness. Thus, while striking down the
pertinent provisions of the Ober Act, it has answered its own demand
that legislation authorizing loyalty oaths be narrowly drawn. That
answer is for state legislatures to conform their loyalty statutes and
oaths to the express provisions of the Whitehill oath.
Constitutional Law-Criminal Law-RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT PROOn June 17, 1959, petitioner Mempa,

BATION REVOCATION HEARINGS.

following a plea of guilty in the Spokane County Superior Court, was
convicted of larceny of an automobile' and placed on probation with
the imposition of sentence deferred.2 Five months later a probation revocation hearing was held pursuant to an allegation by the Spokane
County prosecuting attorney that Mempa had been involved in a burglary on September 15, 1959. At this hearing Mempa, then 17, was not
represented by counsel nor was inquiry made by the court as to
whether the defendant desired assistance of counsel. When questioned
by the court, Mempa affirmed his complicity in the burglary. The
hearing was immediately terminated and the court revoked the defendant's probation, imposing sentence of ten years in the penitentiary'
4
with the recommendation that the sentence be reduced to one year.
In 1966, Mempa filed a petition on his own behalf for a writ of habeas
corpus claiming that he had been denied right to counsel at the probation revocation hearing. The Washington State Supreme Court dismissed the petitions and the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari.' In its decision, 7 the Court reversed, holding that the presence
of counsel is necessary in probation revocation or deferred sentencing
hearings.
decisions the oaths expressly or by implication included the statutory terms of the

enabling acts.
29. "If Gerende is ripe for final dispatch, the task is for the Supreme Court, not a
subordinate court." Whitehill v. Elkins, 258 F. Supp. 589, 598 (D. Md. 1966). See
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) overruling Adler.
1. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.54.020 (1961).
2. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.95.200 (1961).
3. WAsu. REV. CODE § 9.95.010 (1961).
4. WASH. REv. CODE § 9.95.030 (1961).
5. Mempa v. Rhay, 68 Wash. 2nd 882,416 P. 2nd 104 (1966).
6. Mempa v. Rhay, 386 U.S. 907 (1967).
7. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).

